By Efi Efthimiou
Russian President Vladimir Putin has urged his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, to push for Russian to be recognized as an “official” language in Ukraine and to ensure protection for the “Russian Orthodox churches” in Ukraine, apparently referring to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which, despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has not severed ties with the Moscow Patriarchate and remains a part of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The New York Times reports that Trump is expected to raise the matter—at Putin’s request—during his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington on Monday, August 18.
The Ukrainian government recently adopted legislation banning religious organizations linked to Russia.
The measure is widely viewed as directly targeting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under Metropolitan Onufriy, who has also been hit with personal sanctions and stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), historically a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, has faced growing controversy over its status in recent years.
In May 2022, just a few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate.
At a meeting of the UOC Council held later that month, amendments and additions to its statutes regarding its administration were approved, “indicating its full autonomy and independence” from Moscow.
However, this was a unilateral decision, and since then the status of the UOC has remained unclear. All Orthodox Churches continue to treat the UOC as part of the Moscow Patriarchate and remain in communion with it.
It is also worth noting that in the Orthodox Church there is no such thing as an ‘independent’ Church that is not autocephalous. The UOC has not received autocephaly from any Church—least of all from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which holds this responsibility.
Many UOC hierarchs also continue to commemorate Patriarch Kirill in their services.
The Russian side, both political and religious, frequently emphasizes the need to “protect” the UOC.
At the end of May 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow publicly defended the Church under Metropolitan Onufriy, stressing that “Russia will not abandon the Orthodox believers of Ukraine.”
Notably, similar efforts to curb Russian religious influence have been undertaken in the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—where authorities have already passed legislation aimed at reducing the Moscow Patriarchate’s control.
