By Efi Efthimiou
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) devotes a separate chapter to the religious situation in Ukraine in its 2025 annual report.
According to the report, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a bill in August introducing new legal amendments concerning the operation of religious organizations, “despite widespread concerns about their compatibility with international law.”
The revised legislation, as outlined in the report, permits the Ukrainian government to ban religious organizations affiliated with foreign religious bodies whose governing center is located in a country currently at war with Ukraine.
In addition, the law explicitly bans the Russian Orthodox Church — which is active only in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine — as well as the ideology of the “Russian World” (Russky Mir).
The Commission notes that these amendments are likely to significantly impact the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which, following Russia’s 2022 invasion, has been viewed with growing suspicion by Ukrainian authorities and society due to its historical and ecclesiastical ties to the Moscow Patriarchate.
The report further warns that the amendments risk imposing collective punishment on segments of religious communities, potentially affecting individuals not directly connected to political or military conflicts.
In December 2024, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also criticized the legislation, arguing that it introduces “disproportionate restrictions” on the freedom to express one’s religion or belief.
In light of these concerns, USCIRF urged the Ukrainian government to ensure that the implementation of the new legislation aligns with international human rights standards.
What is the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), under Metropolitan Onufriy, has yet to clearly define its position regarding its relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In May 2022, during a formal assembly, the UOC declared itself “fully independent and autonomous” from the Moscow Patriarchate. However, this declaration was not ratified through ecclesiastical canons, and the UOC has neither received autocephaly nor undertaken the necessary canonical steps typically required for such a status to be considered valid within the Orthodox Church.
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow outright rejected the UOC’s declaration of independence. Just two days after the announcement, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church convened and emphasized that the UOC’s decisions came under what it described as “unprecedented pressure from schismatic groups, media influence, extremist organizations, and nationalist sentiments within public opinion.”
The Russian Synod reaffirmed that the canonical status of the UOC had been defined by the letter of Patriarch Alexy II, dated October 27, 1990, and remained unchanged. It further stated that any amendments to the UOC’s statutes require the approval of the Patriarch of Moscow in order to be valid.
The Synod also criticized the decision by some UOC dioceses to cease commemorating the Patriarch of Moscow, claiming this action violates the 15th Canon of the First-Second Council, and has already caused internal divisions within the UOC.
Notably, according to Orthodoxtimes.com, some UOC bishops continue to commemorate Patriarch Kirill to this day, despite the formal declaration of independence.
Moreover, the latest diptychs issued by the Russian Orthodox Church continue to include Metropolitan Onufriy and UOC bishops as part of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.
To date, the UOC has not issued an official statement confirming its intention to sever ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. Metropolitan Onufriy himself has remained notably restrained and cautious in his public comments on the matter.
