By Hieromonk Nikitas Pantokratorinos
On May 27, 2022, a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, headed by Metropolitan Onufry, declared its independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. This “independence,” as events have demonstrated, remains largely virtual and communicative rather than substantive. Since then, this ecclesiastical structure has convened a Synod every year on the same date to commemorate this declaration of “independence.”
At the most recent Synod, held a few days ago, Archbishop Sylvester, the Church’s spokesperson, reiterated that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church exists as a fully independent Church and maintains communion with the other Local Orthodox Churches. This assertion seeks to reinforce the image of a fully independent ecclesiastical entity in Ukraine. However, it fails to address the fundamental question: what exactly is the canonical status of this Church? The reality remains unchanged. This Church has neither received a Tomos of Autocephaly nor joined another ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it has never announced a severance of Eucharistic communion with the Moscow Patriarchate. What it did announce was the removal of certain references to dependence on the Moscow Patriarchate from its statutes, while simultaneously proclaiming its “full autonomy and independence.” In practice, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church carefully avoided any explicit canonical rupture with the Moscow Patriarchate.
Even more significantly, the Moscow Patriarchate itself has never acknowledged that this Church departed from the Russian Orthodox Church. On the contrary, it has consistently continued to regard it as an integral part of its ecclesiastical structure. The Russian Church has never declared that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry is outside its jurisdiction, nor has it announced a severance of Eucharistic communion.
To this day, it continues to recognize Metropolitan Onufry as the canonical Primate of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Even more revealing is that the Russian Church made it clear that these changes voted by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry had to be examined and approved by the Patriarch of Moscow, in accordance with the Charter of the Russian Church. This alone debunks the myth of “complete independence.” Because no truly independent Church seeks approval from another Church for its internal decisions. Moscow’s canonical position has remained clear, consistent, and unambiguous. It does not constantly need to prove that it is independent.
Even today, four years after the 2022 Synod, the debate constantly revolves around whether this Church was indeed cut off from Moscow. This alone is telling. When one Church has genuinely separated from another, such a reality does not remain a matter of perpetual dispute, nor is it interpreted in fundamentally different ways by different sides.
The problem becomes even more serious in practice. Because despite the declarations of “independence”, many bishops and clergy of this structure continue to commemorate Patriarch Kirill. That is, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church continues to recognize Moscow as an ecclesiastical authority, both liturgically and canonically.
As a result, the rhetoric of “complete independence” appears less as a clearly defined ecclesiological act and more as an attempt at political survival within Ukrainian society. This Church tries to balance between two worlds: on the one hand to distance itself from the Russian war and the destructive attitude of Patriarch Kirill and to appear as independent inside Ukraine and on the other hand not to really break its ties with Moscow. This ambiguity ultimately serves the interests of the Moscow Patriarchate, which seeks to preserve its ecclesiastical influence in Ukraine despite the Russian invasion. It also enables Moscow to continue presenting this structure as its own canonical presence within the country.
Within this context, the recent expressions of support for this Church by the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church should also be understood. By referring to the “persecution of the canonical Church in Ukraine,” the Serbian Church is, in effect, defending not merely the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry, but also the broader ecclesiastical narrative promoted by the Moscow Patriarchate. Its primary concern appears to be neither the restoration of ecclesiastical peace in Ukraine nor the unity of the Orthodox world, but rather the provision of political and ecclesiastical support to Moscow.
If its overriding concern were truly canonical order and ecclesiastical reconciliation, it would acknowledge that an Autocephalous Orthodox Church already exists in Ukraine, having received a Tomos of Autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Serbian Church insists on presenting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry as the only “canonical Church”. While the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine possesses a Tomos of Autocephaly granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and enjoys a clearly defined ecclesiastical identity, the Serbian Church continues to reject its legitimacy. Instead, it chooses to support an ecclesiastical structure that, even today, remains unable to provide a clear answer to a simple question: if it no longer belongs to Moscow, then to whom does it belong?
Herein lies the fundamental contradiction in the position of the Serbian Church. While it labels the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine as “schismatic,” it simultaneously tolerates an ecclesiastical structure that has proclaimed independence without receiving recognized autocephaly, without possessing a clearly defined canonical status, and without formally severing its ties with the Moscow Patriarchate. That is, it accepts an ecclesiastical ambiguity only because it serves the interests of the Russian Church, since this structure remains the last great tool of the Russian ecclesiastical presence in Ukraine. This demonstrates that the issue at stake is not canonical consistency, but rather a broader geopolitical and ecclesiastical alignment with the Moscow Patriarchate.
By contrast, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine is the only Ukrainian Church whose independence is formally and canonically defined. It has received a Tomos of Autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, is institutionally independent of Moscow, and reflects the aspiration of many Ukrainians for ecclesiastical self-governance free from Russian influence. Those who continue to deny this reality are not essentially defending canonicality, but Moscow’s geopolitical influence within Orthodoxy. This is becoming increasingly apparent.
In his recent statements, Archbishop Sylvester sought to draw a parallel between the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry and that of the Church of North Macedonia, apparently in an effort to justify the ambiguous and contested status of his own ecclesiastical structure. Such a comparison, however, is neither historically nor ecclesiologically convincing. First, the case of North Macedonia emerged from a highly controversial ecclesiastical process that generated as many questions as it purported to resolve.
The Serbian Orthodox Church sought to present itself as the granting authority of autocephaly by issuing a Tomos to the Church of North Macedonia, despite the longstanding canonical and historical position that the granting of autocephaly belongs to the competence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This is not merely a matter of differing interpretations of ecclesiastical tradition; it constitutes a direct challenge to the prerogatives and responsibilities historically exercised by the Ecumenical Throne within the Orthodox Church. The historical act of the Church is clear: the newest autocephaly in the Orthodox world was granted through the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which functions as a center of pan-Orthodox unity and canonical order.
The Serbian Church effectively attempted to promote an alternative model for the granting of autocephaly, one that closely reflects the Russian ecclesiological vision of a polycentric Orthodoxy lacking an effective coordinating primacy. Such an approach carries significant risks and, therefore, Orthodoxy would gradually move toward ecclesiastical fragmentation and a form of “Orthodox national feudalism,” in which competing centers of power would determine canonical legitimacy according to their own interests.
Even if one accepts the outcome of the North Macedonian case, it remains fundamentally different from the situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In North Macedonia, there was at least a clearly identifiable ecclesiastical process. Communion was first restored by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, then recognized by the Serbian Orthodox Church, and ultimately a specific ecclesiastical status was granted, regardless of the serious canonical questions surrounding the manner in which it was awarded. In the case of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry, no comparable process exists. There has been no act granting either canonical or non-canonical autocephaly, no synodal recognition by another Local Church of its independence from Moscow, no clearly defined ecclesiological status, and no unequivocal rupture in its relationship of dependence on the Russian Orthodox Church.
At the same time, the Serbian Church finds itself in a position of evident contradiction. On the one hand, it rejects the Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate—the institution that, according to the historical and canonical tradition of Orthodoxy, possesses the prerogative to issue Tomoi of Autocephaly.
On the other hand, it promotes ecclesiastical arrangements through unilateral actions that lack pan-Orthodox consensus. The hypocrisy is obvious. When the Ecumenical Patriarchate grants Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in accordance with its established prerogatives, it is accused of allegedly anti-canonical intervention. Yet when the Serbian Church attempts to confer autocephalous status upon the Church of North Macedonia without possessing the same historical and canonical authority, the action is presented as a contribution to ecclesiastical reconciliation and unity. Such an inconsistency reveals that the determining criterion is not canonical coherence but geopolitical alignment with Moscow.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine remains the only Ukrainian Church whose ecclesiastical status is clearly defined. It possesses a Tomos of Autocephaly issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, enjoys a distinct canonical identity, and maintains no relationship of dependence upon Russian ecclesiastical authority. By contrast, continued support for the ambiguous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufry, or the invocation of the North Macedonian case as a precedent, contributes to the normalization of ecclesiastical uncertainty. Ultimately, such positions weaken the coherence of Orthodox canonical order and reinforce a vision of Orthodoxy centered on the geopolitical interests of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Translated by: Konstantinos Menyktas
